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Who Is the Narrator? 
Richard Walsh 
University of York 
Who is the narrator? Today most literary critics are happy to regard the narrator as an 
inherent feature of narrative, although the coherence of any distinct concept of such a 
narrating agent remains debatable, to say the least.1 In calling the narrator into 
question, I want also to question the broad assumptions that have sustained the 
concept in critical practice; I do not think of it as a purely narratological matter, but 
one that has large consequences for our understanding of fiction. Indeed, the 
QDUUDWRU¶VSURPRWLRQIURPUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODFFLGHQFHWRVWUXFWXUDOHVVHQFHKDV
occurred specifically in response to the qualities of fiction, not narrative per se; and 
the concept has only been put to the most cursory use outside the fictional context. 
This is because the narrator, thus understood, functions primarily to establish a 
representational frame within which the narrative discourse may be read as report 
rather than invention.2 In other words, it defines the extent to which we can set aside 
our knowledge that the narrative in hand is indeed fictional. By conceiving of a 
fictional narrative as issuing from a fictional narrator, the reader has cancelled out its 
fictionality, negotiated a mode of complicity with representation, and found a 
rationale for suspension of disbelief. I want to suggest, though, that certain dubious 
critical tendencies are perpetuated by this model of fiction. Firstly, critical 
interpretation tends, in point of detail, to be confLQHGZLWKLQWKHQDUUDWLYH¶V
representational frame, rather than attending to its rhetorical import²with the 
FRPPRQUHVXOWWKDWFULWLFLVPLQGXOJHVWRRIDULQFROODERUDWLRQZLWKWKHILFWLRQ¶VRZQ
rhetoric of representation. Secondly, the representational frame induces a kind of 
critical double vision that separates this intrafictional perspective from a larger sense 
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of the fiction as a literary work (characterized by its style, technique, themes, 
symbolism, etc.); and the effect of this dichotomy is that such literary considerations 
become the belated response to a naive primary reading experience. I would want to 
argue that as the basis for reading fiction, a willing suspension of disbelief will not 
do: disbelief is essential to reading a work of fiction as fictional, and only by doing so 
FDQZHDSSUHKHQGWKHHIIHFWVLWDFKLHYHVE\PHDQVRIILFWLRQ¶VRZQSDUWLFXODUOLWHUDU\
UHVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJWKHLQYROYHPHQWWRZKLFKWKHSKUDVH³VXVSHQVLRQRIGLVEHOLHI´
testifies. One of the consequences of rejecting the concept of the narrator is that the 
representational frame, as an impassable barrier between the creative and (putatively) 
informative aspects of fiction, is breached. It is with this in mind that I am going to 
question the idea that the narrator, as a distinct and inherent agent of fictional 
narrative, is a logical, or even plausible, construct. 
,¶GOLNHWRDSSURDFKWKHSUREOHPVFKHPDWLFDOO\LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHE\LQYRNLQJ
WZRRI*pUDUG*HQHWWH¶VGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQKRPRGLHJHWLFDQGKHWHURGLHJHWLF
narrators (a matter of person: that is, in place of the common distinction between first- 
and third-person narrators, a more exact contrast between involvement and non-
involvement in the story); and between intradiegetic and extradiegetic narrators (a 
matter of level: that is, the distinction between a narrator who narrates within a larger, 
framing narrative, and one whose narration itself constitutes the primary narrative). 
Between them, these distinctions produce four classes of narrators (Genette 1980: 
248): my intention is to show that none of them require a distinct narrative agent. The 
two intradiegetic classes are relatively straightforward: these narrators are simply 
characters, within a narrative, who relate a story in which (respectively) they are and 
are not themselves involved. Marlow in Heart of DarknessVLWWLQJDERDUGWKH³1HOOLH´ 
on the sea reach of the Thames and narrating his journey to the farthest point of 
navigation, is intradiegetic and homodiegetic; In Sarrasine 0PHGH5RFKHILGH¶V
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unnamed adPLUHUZKRWHOOVKHUWKHVFXOSWRU¶VVWRU\RQWKHHYHQLQJDIWHUWKH/DQW\
ball, is intradiegetic and heterodiegetic. The extradiegetic categories are more 
difficult. Genette maintains that extradiegetic narrators, being outside any diegesis, 
cannot be characters²³IRUWKDWZRXOGEHPHDQLQJOHVV´ (Genette 1988: 85): yet an 
extradiegetic homodiegetic narrator like Huck Finn is, of course, identified with a 
character in the story. So the extradiegetic homodiegetic case seems to establish a 
clear distinction, even within the fictional frame, between characters and narrators. 
But obviously many such narrators²Huck Finn, Tristram Shandy, Humbert Humbert, 
Molloy²are at least as strongly characterized in the telling of their tales as they are in 
the role of protagonist. How then are they different from their intradiegetic 
counterparts? Genette has himself acknowledged that the distinction between 
H[WUDGLHJHWLFDQGLQWUDGLHJHWLFLVUHODWLYHO\XQLPSRUWDQWJLYHQWKDW³DOOWKDWLVQHHGHG
to convert an extradiegetic narration into an embedded narration is a sentence of 
SUHVHQWDWLRQ´ (1988: 95). He illustrates the point with a playful revision of A la 
recherche du temps perduDIDYRXUHGH[WUDGLHJHWLFKRPRGLHJHWLFQDUUDWLRQ,VKDQ¶W
quote in full, as the crux is simply this: ³0DUFHOFOHDUHGKLVWKURDWDQGEHJDQµ)RUD
ORQJWLPH,XVHGWRJRWREHGHDUO\¶HWF´9HU\ZHOOEXWFRQVLGHUWKH
YDVWO\GLIIHUHQWHIIHFWRIWKLV³7KHLURQLFVSLQVWHUFOHDUHGKHUWKURDWDQGREVHUYHGµ,W
is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good 
IRUWXQH¶HWF´7KLVVHFRQGFDVHLVWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIDQH[WUDGLHJHWLF
heterodiegetic narration, and involves something that the first did not²namely the 
creation of a character (we might want to call her Jane). I shall return to the case of 
extradiegetic heterodiegetic narration in a moment, but first I want to pursue the 
LPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKLVGLIIHUHQFHIRU*HQHWWH¶VKRPRGLHJHWLFH[DPSOH0\SRLQWLVWKDW
in such a case, the only necessary effect of the transformation from extra- to 
intradiegetic is a specification of the narrating instance. This cannot amount to a 
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FKDQJHLQOHYHODVIRU*HQHWWHDQDUUDWLQJLQVWDQFHLVLPSOLHGE\HYHU\QDUUDWLYH³WKH
main point of Narrative Discourse, beginning with its title, reflects the assumption 
that there is an enunciating instance²the narrating²with its narrator and its narratee, 
fictive or not, represented or not, silent or chatty, but always present in what is indeed 
IRUPH,IHDUDQDFWRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´ (1988: 101). Indeed, to concede that a 
narrating instance is not implied by every narrative would be to concede to the 
linguistic arguments for non-narrated narratives advanced by Ann Banfield (1982) 
and others. Discourse, as an act of communication, is action; in fiction, the 
represented discourse of a homodiegetic narrator is therefore represented action. And 
what is action but the illustration of character? Extradiegetic homodiegetic narrators 
are indeed characters, and if there is any meaninglessness lurking in that formulation, 
it can be located in the concept of the extradiegetic itself. Narrators are always outside 
WKHIUDPHRIWKHVWRULHVWKH\WHOO³H[WUDGLHJHWLF´DSSHDUVWRKDYHWKHDGGLWLRQDOIRUFH
of placing the narrator outside representation. But if the narrator is fictional, where 
would that be? In such cases the telling of the story is itself a represented event, as 
clearly represented as any act of speech, thought or writing in the story: we could 
legitimately put quotation marks around the whole. 
The purpose of my attention to the extradiegetic homodiegetic narrator has been 
to establish this preliminary point: there is nothing about the internal logic of fictional 
representation that demands a qualitative distinction between narrators and characters. 
Such narrators, being represented, are characters, exactly as intradiegetic narrators 
are. But of course it is the fourth class of narration, the extradiegetic heterodiegetic, 
that constitutes the real issue. In this class fall those narratives that we might want to 
FDOO³LPSHUVRQDOO\QDUUDWHG´VXFKDVThe Ambassadors, The Trial, or Mrs Dalloway; 
DVZHOODVZKDWLVVRPHWLPHVFDOOHG³DXWKRULDOQDUUDWLRQ´²Tom Jones, Vanity Fair or 
Middlemarch. The one irreducible fact underlying the impulse to attribute such 
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narratives to a narrator is that these narratives are fictional: despite the token gestures 
of narratologists whose bias towards fiction sits uneasily with their claims for the 
more general bearing of narratology, there is no more reason to posit a narrator for 
historical or biographical narrative than to attribute every non-fictional discourse to a 
textual agent.3 *HQHWWH¶VRZQHDUO\VWDWHPHQWRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJDVVXPSWLRQLV
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH³WKHQDUUDWRURIPère Goriot µLV¶QRW%DO]DF´KHVD\V³HYHQLf here 
and there he expresses Balzac's opinions, for this author-narrator is someone who 
µNQRZV¶WKH9DXTXHUERDUGLQJKRXVHLWVODQGODG\DQGLWVORGJHUVZKHUHDVDOO%DO]DF
KLPVHOIGRHVLVLPDJLQHWKHP´7KHIXQFWLRQRIWKHQDUUDWRULVWRDOORZ 
the narrative to be read as something known rather than something imagined; 
something reported as fact rather than something told as fiction.4 But this view of the 
matter suffers the embarrassment that some of the things such a narrator is required to 
³NQRZ´DUHFOHDULQGLFHVRIWKHQDUUDWLYH¶VILFWLRQDOVWDWXV7KHPRVWREYLRXVRIWKHVH
occurs with internal and free focalization²WKDWLVWKHQDUUDWLYH¶VDFFHVVWRWKHPLQG
RIDQRWKHU³KHUKHDUWOLNHDODUGHGSDUWULGJHVZHOWHUHGEHIRUHWKHILUHRIDEXUQing 
desire to shake off the shroud of Vauquer and rise again as Goriot. She would marry 
again, sell her boarding-house, give her hand to this fine flower of citizenship . . ´ 
(Balzac 1991[1835]: 16-17). The only way to account for such knowledge of 
characWHUV¶PLQGVLQWHUPVRIWKHQDUUDWRUPRGHOLVWRWDNHTXLWHOLWHUDOO\WKHILJXUDWLYH
FRQFHSWRI³RPQLVFLHQW´QDUUDWLRQLQRUGHUWRNQRZUDWKHUWKDQLPDJLQHWKH
(evidently superhuman) agent of narration must indeed have such powers. 
³2PQLVFLHQFH´,ZRXOG suggest, is not a faculty possessed by a certain class of 
narrators but, precisely, a quality of imagination. Even when authors self-consciously 
dwell upon their own omniscience with regard to their creations, the power itself is 
fanciful. The reader is not obliged to hypothesize a narrator who really is omniscient 
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ZLWKLQWKHWHUPVRIDJLYHQILFWLRQEHFDXVHWKHDXWKRULDOLPDJLQDWLYHDFWGRHVQ¶W
merely initiate a fiction, but pervades it. 
There are other aspects of focalization, even where omniscience is apparently 
renounced, that prove unassimilable to the concept of the narrator as the one who 
³NQRZV´&RQVLGHUH[WHUQDOIRFDOL]DWLRQZKLFKSURKLELWVDQ\DFFHVVWRWKHFKDUDFWHUV¶
WKRXJKWVKHUH³WKHIRFXVLVVLWXDWHGDWDSRLQWLQWKHGLHJHWLFXQLYHUVHFKosen by the 
narrator, outside every character´ (Genette 1988: 75). But this focus cannot be 
XQGHUVWRRGDVDKHWHURGLHJHWLFQDUUDWRU¶VRZQSHUVSHFWLYHEHFDXVHWKDWZRXOGPDNH
the narrator homodiegetic²even if anonymous and perhaps non-corporeal. Seymour 
Chatman, discussing the issue of focalization, has rightly insisted upon the radical 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQQDUUDWRULDO³VODQW´DQGFKDUDFWHU³ILOWHU´WKHQDUUDWRU³LVD
UHSRUWHUQRWDQµREVHUYHU¶RIWKHVWRU\ZRUOGLQWKHVHQVHRIOLWHUDOO\ZLWQHVVLQJLW,W
PDNHVQRVHQVHWRVD\WKDWDVWRU\LVWROGµWKURXJK¶WKHQDUUDWRU¶VSHUFHSWLRQVLQFH
he/she/it is precisely narrating, which is not an act of perception but of presentation 
RUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ (1990: 142).5 He draws the necessary conclusions for the category 
RIQDUUDWLRQZHDUHFRQVLGHULQJKHUH³7KHKHWHURGLHJHWLFQDUUDWRUnever saw the 
events because he/she/it never occupied the story world. . . . Even for so-called 
µFDPHUD-H\H¶QDUUDWLRQLWLVDOZD\VDQGRQO\as if the narrator were seeing the events 
tranVSLUHEHIRUHKLVYHU\H\HVDWWKHPRPHQWRIQDUUDWLRQ´LELG-45). How are we 
WRXQGHUVWDQGWKLV³DVLI´":HFDQQRWUHVRUWDJDLQWRRPQLVFLHQFHXQOHVVZH
FRPSURPLVHLWE\DVVXPLQJDVXVWDLQHGQDUUDWRULDOUHWLFHQFHDERXWWKHFKDUDFWHUV¶
thoughts, and other such matters. This reticence could only be disingenuous: in 
*HQHWWH¶VWHUPVLWZRXOGKDYHWREHGHVFULEHGSDUDGR[LFDOO\DVDGHILQLQJSDUDOLSVLV
So the only way to construe external focalization would be as the work of the 
QDUUDWRU¶VLPDJLQDWLRQDJDLQWKHQDUUDWRU¶VUDWLRQDOHDVWKHRQHZKR³NQRZV´LV
undermined. 
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2IFRXUVHWKHSRLQWLVQ¶WUHDOO\WKDWWKHQDUUDWRU³NQRZV´DWDOOLW¶VWKDWWKHDXWKRU
FDQ¶WNQRZ7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHQDUUDWRULVWRUHOHDVHWKHDXWKRUIURPDQ\
accountability for the ³IDFWV´RIILFWLRQDOQDUUDWLYH*HQHWWHKDVFRGLILHGWKLVSULQFLSOH
LQWKHGRXEOHIRUPXOD³$ = N ĺ factual narrative and A  N ĺfictional narrative´
ZKHUHWKHHTXDOVLJQV\PEROL]HV³WKHVHULRXVFRPPLWPHQWRIWKHDXWKRUZLWKUHJDUGWR
his narrative assertLRQV´D7KLVQDUURZGHILQLWLRQRILGHQWLW\LV
DGRSWHGLQSUHIHUHQFHWR³RQRPDVWLFRUELRJUDSKLFDOLGHQWLW\´EHFDXVHWKHQDUUDWRURI
a manifestly fictional story may indeed be identified with its author in these terms, as 
is the case in BorJHV¶³(O$OHSK´RULQTom Jones. It is perfectly clear that Fielding 
³GRHVQRWLQWKHOHDVWYRXFKIRUWKHKLVWRULFDOYHUDFLW\RIWKHDVVHUWLRQVRIKLV
QDUUDWLYH´EXW*HQHWWHDUJXHVIXUWKHUWKDWKHGRHVQRW³LGHQWLI\ZLWKWKHQDUUDWRUZKR
is supposed to have produced it, any more than I, good citizen, family man, and free-
thinker, identify with the voice that, through my mouth, produces an ironic or playful 
VWDWHPHQWVXFKDVµ,DPWKH3RSH¶ ´ (1990a: 768). The assumption is that fiction and 
LURQ\DUH³QRQVHULRXV´VSHHFKDFWVDQGVRUHTXLUHDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHLUDFWXDO
and pretended speakers. Genette is following John Searle, whose account of fictional 
utterances as pretended acts of assertion is the canonical speech act treatment; and if 
the implication of a narrator is not quite self-HYLGHQWLQ6HDUOH¶VSUHWHQFHIRUPXODLW
PD\DUJXDEO\EHSUHVHQWLQDQRWKHUGHVFULSWLRQ³LPLWDWLQJWKHPDNLQJRIDQ
DVVHUWLRQ´ZKLFKKHRIIHUVDVHTXLYDOHQW6HDUOHE6HDUOHDSSURDFKHV
fiction with priorities very different from those of the literary theorist, however: he 
remains in broad sympathy with J. L. $XVWLQ¶VYLHZWKDWVXFKPDWWHUV³IDOOXQGHUWKH
doctrine of the etiolations RIODQJXDJH´$XVWLQ>@6HDUOH¶VVRPHZKDW
hasty and dismissive response to fiction is motivated by the evident need to 
distinguish it from mere falsehood: if a fictional utterance is read simply as an 
authorial assertion, then it must be taken as infelicitous²an error or a lie²which 
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hardly satisfies our sense of how fiction works. But his own pretence theory is equally 
unsatisfactory from a literary point of view because, far from using speech act theory 
to explain fiction, it disqualifies fiction in order to protect speech act theory. To 
FODVVLI\ILFWLRQDVD³QRQVHULRXV´VSHHFKDFWLVVLPSO\WRGLVDOORZLWWKHSUREOHPRI
fictionality is not accounted for, but merely displaced. So, instead of a real act of 
asserting something fictional, Searle gives us an imitated act of assertion: that is, a 
fictional act of assertion, since fictionality (unlike falsehood) is an ontological 
property, not just a property of propositions. A fictional act of assertion would not 
seem to be any less problematic than an act of asserting something fictional: it has 
merely expelled fictionality from the domain of speech act theory. And if this account 
of fiction as authorially disavowed assertion amounts to the creation of a narrator, as 
Genette assumes, then its question-begging is even more starkly exposed. Either the 
narrator is fictional, or the narrator asserts something fictional: in either case such an 
account can have no bearing at all on fictionality, which remains to be explained. The 
pretence formula can only accommodate fictionality by invoking a narrator 
simultaneously inside and outside the fiction. 
*HQHWWH¶VRZQUHVSRQVHWR6HDUOHJRHVVRPHZD\WRZDUGVDGGUHVVLQJWKHSUREOHP
by arguing that the description of fiction as pretended assertion does not exclude the 
use of fictional utterances to perform some other, serious illocutionary act. The aim of 
KLVLQWHUYHQWLRQ³LVE\QRPHDQVWRreplace 6HDUOH
Vµ)LFWLRQDOWH[WVDUHSUHWHQGHG
DVVHUWLRQV¶EXWWRcomplete LWDSSUR[LPDWHO\DVIROORZVµZKLFKKLGHXQGHU
indirect speech acts, fictional speech acts that are themselves illocutionary acts sui 
specieiVHULRXVE\GHILQLWLRQ´*HQHWWHE,QGLUHFWVSHHFKDFWVDPRQJ
which Genette includes figurative utterances, as simply indirect speech acts with an 
unacceptable literal meaning) are those in which one illocutionary act serves as the 
YHKLFOHIRUDQRWKHU³<RX¶UHVWDQGLQJRQP\IRRW´LVDOVRDUHTXHVWWKDW\RXJHWRII
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³+HJHOLVDGHDGKRUVH´LVDOVRDQDVVHUWLRQWKDWLWLVQRORQJHUZRUWKGLVSXWLQJZLWK
him.6 To be understood, indirect speech acts need to be considered in relation to their 
contexts, on the basis of a set of accepted rules for cooperative communication such 
as H. P. *ULFHKDVRXWOLQHG*ULFH¶V³&RRSHUDWLYH3ULQFLSOH´VWDWHVWKHFULWHULDIRUWKH
successful performance of a serious speech act in a few general maxims: one of these 
LVWKHILUVWPD[LPRI4XDOLW\³GRQRWVD\ZKDW\RXEHOLHYHWREHIDOVH´DQRWKHULVWKH
PD[LPRI5HODWLRQ³EHUHOHYDQW´ (Grice 1975: 46). The literal illocution of an indirect 
speech act manifestly disregards the Cooperative Principle, typically by being 
irrelevant, but also by being false: if an indirect speech act were exhausted in its 
literal illocution, it would have to be regarded as infelicitous. But because this 
disregard for the Cooperative Principle is so blatant, we are led to suppose that the 
maxims are not just being violated, but exploited. This process, by which we are 
prompted to look for a nonliteral illocution that will successfully relate the speech act 
WRLWVFRQWH[WLVZKDW*ULFHWHUPV³FRQYHUVDWLRQDOLPSOLFDWXUH´ So, the maxim of 
quality may be furtively violated (as it is in lying), in which case the Cooperative 
Principle breaks down; but it may also be flouted (blatantly violated, as in irony, or in 
a work of fiction), in which case we are able to assume it is being exploited in the 
interests of conversational implicature, and so conclude that the Cooperative Principle 
is being maintained indirectly.  
For Genette, fictional texts are indirect speech acts that imply, by means of 
pretended assertions, acts in the cDWHJRU\RI³GHFODUDWLYHLOORFXWLRQVZLWKDQLQVWLWXWLYH
IXQFWLRQ´EWKDWLVDFWVGHFODULQJWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDILFWLRQDOZRUOG7KH
illocutionary act of establishing this fictional world, with the agreement of an 
audience²*HQHWWHFLWHV³&ROHULGJH¶VGXUDEOHSKUDVH´LELG²is the serious 
element of the fictional utterance. I have two objections: firstly, if fictional utterances 
are indirect speech acts, they must do something more than institute a fictional world. 
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Genette sometimes appears to regard this declarative illocution as itself a fictional 
speech act, in which case it remains within the frame of fictionality, and adds nothing 
WR6HDUOH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHDXWKRULDOVSHHFKDFWEXWLQDQ\FDVHLWFRQILQHVWKHFUHDWLYH
act to the existential matter of fiction, without any sense of the extent to which this act 
concerns meaning, in language, rather than existence. This sits uncomfortably with 
*HQHWWH¶VFODLPWKDWWKHQRYHOLVWWKHUHE\FUHDWHV³Dwork RIILFWLRQ´DVKHVHHPVWR
acknowledge when he says (with more than a hint of circularity) that the successful 
DFKLHYHPHQWRIDILFWLRQ¶VLOORFXWLRQDU\LQWHQWLRQFRQVLVWV³DWOHDVW´LQKDYLQJLWV
fictional intention recognized (1990b: 62, 67-68). His own account seems to allow 
this much at most, in which case it cannot be a sufficient general formula; nor, I think, 
is it sufficient even on occasion. 
Secondly, if fictional utterances are to have an indirect illocutionary force then the 
literal speech acts by which they achieve this cannot be pretended, but must be 
seriously performed. Genette can only interpret pretended speech acts as indirect 
speech acts by blurring two distinct concepts: he notes that Searle himself explicitly 
UHIXVHVWRFRQVLGHUILFWLRQDVILJXUDWLYHXWWHUDQFH³LQWKHQDPHRIDGLstinction, to my 
PLQGUDWKHUIUDJLOHEHWZHHQµQRQVHULRXV¶DQGµQRQOLWHUDO¶ ´E%XW6HDUOHLV
right in this respect: as he defines it, seriousness attaches to illocutionary intention, 
whereas literalness attaches to sentence meaning. This is why he makes it clear that 
³WRSUHWHQG´LVLWVHOIDQLQWHQWLRQDOYHUELI\RXGLGQ¶WLQWHQGWRSUHWHQG\RXGLGQ¶W
pretend (Searle 1975b: 325). Searle distinguishes between serious and nonserious 
(pretended) speech acts according to whether or not the illocutionary act was actually 
SHUIRUPHG,IWKHUHLVQRDFWXDOSHUIRUPDQFHEXWRQO\D³SVHXGRSHUIRUPDQFH´E
325), then there is no possibility of a serious indirect speech act because the felicity 
conditions (or maxims, after Grice) normally attaching to the speech act are 
suspended, in which case they cannot even be violated, much less flouted in the 
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interests of conversational implicature. Genette seems to interpret seriousness as 
sincerity, which allows him to say that any nonliteral illocution is obviously also, in 
its literal sense, nonserious (read insincere). But sincerity is just a condition upon the 
success of serious speech acts²LWGRHVQ¶WHYHQDULVHunless the speech act is serious. 
,ISUHWHQFHLVXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHVHQVHLWKDVLQ6HDUOH¶VDFFRXQW, then indirect speech 
acts and pretended speech acts are incompatible. And even if Genette has silently 
UHIRUPXODWHG6HDUOH¶VSUHWHQFHDFFRXQWDV³SUHWHQGLQJWREHWKHQDUUDWRU´WKLV
translates the model for third-person fictional utterance into that for first-person 
fiction; in which case the discourse itself is intrafictional, and excludes the possibility 
of any indirect speech act declaring its fictionality.7 If the indirect speech act model 
applies to fictional utterance, then the pretence model does not; but if pretended 
speech acts are not involved in fiction, neither is the narrator. 
My argument is that pretence can have no role in an account of fictional utterance, 
HLWKHUDORQHRULQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKLQGLUHFWVSHHFKDFWV,GRQ¶WZLVKWRUHSXGLDWHthe 
LGHDRIILFWLRQVDVLQGLUHFWVSHHFKDFWVWKHEURDGRXWOLQHVRI*HQHWWH¶VDFFRXQWVWULNH
me as highly suggestive. But the model requires that fictional utterances are serious 
authorial speech acts, and this excludes any possibility of a default narrator. If, when 
*HQHWWHGHFODUHV³,DPWKH3RSH´ZHDVVXPHWKDWKHLVQHLWKHUGHFHLWIXOQRUGHOXGHG
but adhering to the Cooperative Principle, then we note the literal absurdity of the 
VWDWHPHQWDQGXQGHUVWDQGSHUKDSV³,DFNQRZOHGJHDIRQGQHVVIRULVVXLQJWhe 
RFFDVLRQDOEXOO´²or some other relevant implicit meaning. There is no phantom 
voice here, because this is a serious speech act, the felicity of which is provided for 
indirectly, by conversational implicature. So it is with fiction: an author can seriously 
narrate a fictional narrative, because its relevance is not a matter of information; its 
falsehood, or indeed any adventitious veracity, is beside the point. Fiction may be 
related to the indirect speech act model in the following way: it is a series of 
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illocutionary acts of assertion (typically) which, whether true or false, are literally 
irrelevant because they cannot be taken as informative; but which imply, by virtue of 
their context²being presented as a novel, a romance, a tall tale, a shaggy-dog story²
the illocutionary act of displaying a narrative. This implied act is normally 
transsentential, comprising as it does the whole narrative, and might better be 
GHVFULEHGDVD³GLVFRXUVHDFW´EXWLQDQ\FDVHLWIXOILOVWKHFULWHULRQRIUHOHYDQFHDVDQ
invitation to contemplate, to interpret, to evaluate; as something worthy of display, 
VRPHWKLQJ³WHOODEOH´7KDWLVLWVUHOHYDQFHLVQRWLQIRUPDWLYHEXWH[KLELWLYHWKH
question of its truthfulness is therefore not applicable as a felicity condition.8  
The DQVZHU,DPSURSRVLQJWRP\RULJLQDOTXHVWLRQ³ZKRLVWKHQDUUDWRU"´LVWKLV
the narrator is always either a character who narrates, or the author. There is no 
intermediate position. The author of a fiction can adopt one of two strategies: to 
narrate a representation, or to represent a narration. I say this in full awareness of 
*HQHWWH¶VFULWLFLVPVRIWKHFRQFHSWRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQGHHGKLVSRLQWWKDW
WKHWHUPHTXLYRFDWHVEHWZHHQ³LQIRUPDWLRQ´DQG³LPLWDWLRQ´LVERUQHRXWE\P\RZQ
antithesLV³5HSUHVHQWDWLRQ´LVDPDWWHURIILFWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQLQ³WRQDUUDWHD
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´EXWDPDWWHURIGLVFXUVLYHLPLWDWLRQLQ³WRUHSUHVHQWDQDUUDWLRQ´
But I persist in the usage on the grounds that this disjunction of means does not at all 
undHUPLQHWKHXQLW\RIWKHUKHWRULFDOHQGWKDW,WDNH³UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´WRVLJQLI\ 
Where does unreliable narration fit into this scheme? The need for a concept of 
unreliable narration arises when we wish to explain inconsistencies in the narrative 
without blaming the author. This is not to say that we do not sometimes find the 
author culpable: when we discover Sancho, in chapter 25 of Don Quixote, riding the 
ass that was stolen from him in chapter 23, we can dismiss it as an oversight on 
&HUYDQWHV¶SDUW:HQHed more substantial reasons than inconsistency alone if we are 
to identify unreliable narration. To be interpreted as unreliable, a narrative must 
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provide some logic by which its inconsistencies can be explained²some means of 
DFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHQDUUDWRU¶Vself-contradictions or manifest distortions. That is, 
unreliability cannot simply be attributed to an impersonal narrator: it must be 
motivated in terms of the psychology of a narrating character.9 
%XWSHUKDSV&KDWPDQ¶VFRQFHSWRIQDUUDWRULDO³VODQW´VXJJHsts a more subtle, 
evaluative form of unreliability. Perhaps it is possible for the language of a novel in 
LWVRZQULJKWZLWKRXWLPSO\LQJDQ\GLVMXQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHQDUUDWLRQDQGWKH³IDFWV´
of the narrative, to cohere into an idiom, register, attitude or ideology that requires a 
distinction between author and narrator. That is after all the situation with first-person 
narration, although there are simpler and more obvious representational grounds for 
identifying a narrator when that narrator is homodiegetic. Is the narrative language 
alone sufficient to betray a narrator? Dorrit Cohn argues that just such a situation may 
DULVHZKHQ³UHSRUWLYH´QDUUDWLYHLVLQWHUUXSWHGE\FRPPHQWDU\+HUH[DPSOHLVIURP
Death in VeniceDQGSURPSWVXVVKHWKLQNVWR³SHUVonalize the source of the weighty 
intervention . . DVDUDWKHUQDUURZDQGRSLQLRQDWHGPRUDOLVW´²in other words, not 
7KRPDV0DQQ&RKQ,GRQ¶WDFWXDOO\ILQGWKHSDVVDJHVKHTXRWHVYHU\
provoking in this respect, but in any case I have strong reservations about the 
possibility of such narratorial characterization in principle. Clearly the difference 
between authorial and narratorial personality must be established in textual terms (it is 
Mann as author, not Mann as public figure, who concerns us here), yet the absence of 
WH[WXDOLQGLFDWRUVVXFKDVLQFRQVLVWHQF\QHFHVVLWDWHVDQDSSHDOWRWKHDXWKRU¶V
personality as already known, prior to the text. Authorial personality can be regarded 
DVDQLQWHUWH[WXDOSKHQRPHQRQWREHDEVWUDFWHGIURPDZULWHU¶s whole corpus; but 
there still remains the unwarranted assumption that this personality is uniform, for 
otherwise there is no reason why the narration in question should not be taken to 
exhibit another aspect of authorial personality. Personality, after all, is not monolithic; 
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not timeless, not unitary, not even necessarily coherent. Indeed novelists, who are 
perhaps rather less straightforward than academics, are quite likely to attitudinize in 
diverse ways in their writing: such mannerism remains an aspect of self-presentation, 
and should not be granted an independent identity. Cohn recognizes that works like 
Death in Venice may indeed be taken as authorial narration, but thinks her 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQSUHIHUDEOH³IRUUHDGHUVLQWHQWRQVDOYDJLQJWKHDHVWKHWLFand ideological 
LQWHJULW\RIWKHZRUNLQTXHVWLRQ´7KHLQWHJULW\VKHLVDFWXDOO\FRQFHUQHG
ZLWKLVWKHDXWKRU¶VQRWWKHZRUN¶V,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWWKHLVVXHRILQWHJULW\RQO\
arises because the work in question has been illegitimately excluded from a prior 
interpretation of authorial personality. In general, I think the possibility of 
distinguishing between authorial and narratorial personality depends upon that 
distinction being available to interpretation as a meaningful aspect of the text¶VRZQ
representational rhetoric.10 At that point, I suspect, the passages of commentary to 
which Cohn appeals would have effectively cohered into a homodiegetic frame 
around the narrative. 
I want, nonetheless, to consider one of the conclusions Cohn draws from the 
possibility that narrative language alone can characterize a narrator. For my purposes 
KHUHWKDWFODLPLQLWVHOIFDXVHVQRGLIILFXOW\LW¶VDFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQLQYROYLQJFUHDWLYH
work, and not something inherent in narrative as such. But since this characterization 
is occasional (it only occurs in passages of commentary within a continuous narrative) 
it must, in my terms, imply an intermittent character. For Cohn, the only logical way 
to account for this is to conclude that the narrator is always present, sometimes overt, 
DQGVRPHWLPHVFRYHUW³%\H[WHQVLRQDQGDQDORJ\´ILFWLRQVOLNHThe Castle or A 
Portrait of the Artist can then be taken to have covert narrators throughout (1990: 
797-98). This covert narrator, wholly uncharacterized, is exactly the kind of pure 
narrative agent I am trying to eradicate. 
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/HDYLQJDVLGHWKHYDOLGLW\RI³H[WHQVLRQDQGDQDORJ\´FDQWKHUHEHVXFKDWKLQJDV
covert narration, even between passages of overt narration? I want to suggest that the 
underlying assumption here²that narrating characters must have continuity of 
being²is an instance of criticism internalizing a literal model of the logic of 
representation, and then using it against the text itself. In representational terms any 
narrating character is the source of the narrative language, certainly: but then 
representation itself is only a product of the fictional deployment of the same 
language. We need to understand these relations hierarchically, in that the language of 
fiction is its means of representation, and representation is its means of ascribing that 
language to a narrator. So to treat a represented instance of narration as ontologically 
prior to the language doing the representing is to press the logic of representation 
beyond representation itself, and make the subordinate term superordinate²that is, to 
assert a paradox in the name of logic. Yet this is exactly what the idea of covert 
narration demands: even when the representation of a narrator is not sustained, the 
whole discourse is interpreted as a unified narrating instance because the narrator, a 
local representational issue of the language, is translated into its global, literal source. 
:HVKRXOGNHHSLQPLQGWKHIDFWWKDWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO³ORJLF´LVDFWXDOO\DILFWLRQDO
rhetoric: it should not be maGHWRH[FHHGLWVEULHI,IDK\SRWKHWLFDOQRYHO¶VODQJXDJH
invokes a narrator in the interest of some local effect, then to interpret this effect as 
indicative of a ubiquitous but otherwise covert narrator is to miss this rhetorical 
subtlety completely in our rage to impose a uniform representational logic upon the 
novel. 
The idea of an intermittent narrating character, on the other hand, would fit such a 
novel very well; and I think it entirely consonant with the rhetoric of fictional 
representation. Consider the situation of homodiegetic narrators: they are far from 
being ubiquitous presences, even if we discard such categorical aberrations as 
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Madame Bovary )ODXEHUWDV&KDUOHV%RYDU\¶VFODVVPDWHLQWKHRSHQLQJFKDSWHURU
Vanity Fair (Thackeray making hLVFKDUDFWHUV¶DFTXDLQWDQFHDW3XPSHUQLFNHOLQ
chapter 62). As Genette has noted, Marcel has a striking propensity to disappear as 
narrator of A la recherche du temps perdu ZKHQHYHU3URXVW¶VSXUSRVHVGHPDQGWKH
omniscience his narrator denies him. (Genette 1980: 250-52). But if Marcel is too 
literary a narrator to make the argument, try Huck Finn. Huck is as strongly realized, 
and ingenuous, a narrator as you could wish for; yet Twain put an explanatory note in 
front of his novel drawing attention to the different dialects it contains, because he 
GLGQ¶WZDQWUHDGHUVWR³VXSSRVHWKDWDOOWKHVHFKDUDFWHUVZHUHWU\LQJWRWDONDOLNHDQG
QRWVXFFHHGLQJ´7ZDLQ>@+HGLGQ¶WGRWKLVWRHPSKDVL]H+XFN¶V
talents as a mimic: nor was it an oversight on his part²KH¶GSDLGSDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQ
to it, he was proud of it, and he wanted to make sure we notice his fine ear for dialect. 
The conclusion must be that, in those parts of the novel where Twain is accurately 
representing the various dialects of the Mississippi valley, the narrating Huck Finn is 
QRWPHUHO\FRYHUWEXWHQWLUHO\DEVHQW,VKRXOGHPSKDVL]HWKDW7ZDLQ¶VQRWHLVQRW
essential to this point: it only makes starkly explicit the truth that a conflict of 
representational objectives is likely to arise in any mediated narrative. There is an 
inherent tension between the representational needs of the narrative transmission and 
those of the narrative events; and in the case of direct speech, it is almost always the 
FKDUDFWHU¶VODQJXDJHLWVHOIWKDWLVUHSUHVHQWHGQRWWKHQDUUDWRU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKDW
language. At such points, the situation is a mirror image of our hypothetical novel: 
local elimination of the narrator rather than local creation of a narrator.11 
There is another figure who threatens to intervene in this discussion of the 
narrator: having made an appeal to the author, I need to take account of the implied 
author. Wayne Booth originally advanced the concept as a way of talking about 
authorial personality and intention without co-opting, or being encumbered by, the 
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DXWKRU¶VDFWXDOELRJUDSK\²for reasons that are well founded in the history of 
criticism. But as his choice of term indicates, he objectified this concept as a distinct 
DJHQWVLWXDWHG³EHWZHHQ´WKHQDUUDWRUDQGWKHDXWKRU,I,DPVaying that in fact the 
narrator and the author are sometimes one and the same, I appear to have simply 
disregarded this intermediate figure. A short answer may be to observe that, as the 
conventional wisdom has it, the implied author (being implied) cannot actually be the 
QDUUDWRU,QWKDWFDVHSHUKDSVWKHLVVXHGRHVQRWDULVHKHUHWKH³LPSOLHGDXWKRU´LV
just the author implied behind a narrating character; and when it is the author who 
narrates, the implied author obviously need not be invoked. But the argument might 
be pressed the other way round: if the locus of textual intent is definitionally the 
implied author, then the narrator cannot be simply the author²and so must be a 
distinct agent. A closer inspection of the implied author is needed to dismiss this 
objection. 
,WLVSRVVLEOHRQUHDGLQJ%RRWK¶VRULJLQDOGLVFXVVLRQLQThe Rhetoric of Fiction, to 
extract two pertinent motives for distinguishing between the real author and the 
implied author. The first is a matter of authorial personality: against Ford Madox 
Ford, Booth insists that Fielding, Defoe and Thackeray cannot be accused of 
LQVLQFHULW\RQWKHEDVLVRIH[WHUQDOHYLGHQFH³$JUHDWZRUNHVWDEOLVKHVWKHµVLQFHULW\¶
of its implied author, regardless of how grossly the man who created that author may 
belie in his other forms of conduct the values embodied in his work. For all we know, 
WKHRQO\VLQFHUHPRPHQWVRIKLVOLIHPD\KDYHEHHQOLYHGDVKHZURWHKLVQRYHO´
%RRWK>@$VWKHVHFRQGVHQWHQFHVXJJHVWV%RRWK¶VGHIHQFHKHUH
actually hovers between two strategies: to declare a separation between the real author 
DQGWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRURUVLPSO\WRUHIXVHWKHXQLIRUPLW\WKDW)RUG¶VULJLG³VLQFHULW\´ 
regardless of the diversity of its occasions, seems to impose upon personality. The 
VHFRQGRSWLRQLWVHHPVWRPHLVTXLWHVXIILFLHQW%RRWK¶VVHFRQGPRWLYHKDVWRGR
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ZLWKDXWKRULDOLQWHQWLRQLQRUGHUWRH[SODLQRXU³DSSUHKHQVLRQRIDFRPSOHWHGDUWLVWLF
ZKROH´DVDWH[WXDOSKHQRPHQRQZHQHHG³DWHUPWKDWLVDVEURDGDVWKHZRUNLWVHOI 
but still capable of calling attention to that work as the product of a choosing, 
evaluating person rather than as a self-H[LVWLQJWKLQJ´>@$JDLQ
WKHGLVWLQFWLRQLVEOXUUHGE\HTXLYRFDWLRQDV&KDWPDQKDVREVHUYHG³WKLVGHILQLWLRQ
sWUDGGOHVWKHIHQFHRIµLQWHQWLRQDOLW\¶KDOIDFFHSWLQJDQGKDOIUHMHFWLQJLWVUHOHYDQFHWR
textual structure. On the one hand, Booth disallows the intention of the real author, 
EXWRQWKHRWKHUKHZLVKHVWRDYRLGFDOOLQJWH[WVµVHOI-existing things¶ ´ (Chatman 
1990: 81). 
&KDWPDQ¶VRZQGHIHQFHRIWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRUSURSRVHVWRUHGHILQHWKHFRQFHSWLQ
RUGHUWR³UHVLVWWKHDQWKURSRPRUSKLFWUDS´GXHWRZKLFKLWFRQWLQXDOO\JUDYLWDWHVEDFN
WRZDUGVWKHUHDODXWKRULQ%RRWK¶VXVDJH&KDWPDQ$FFRUGLQJO\ he takes 
³WKHDQWL-intentionalist view that a published text is in fact a self-existing thing. . . . 
7KHWH[WLVLWVHOIWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRU´LELG+LVDUJXPHQWLVIRXQGHGXSRQD
distinction between oral and written narrative: the oral situation is straightforward, 
WKDQNVWRWKHDFWXDOSUHVHQFHRIWKHDXWKRUEXWLQWKHFDVHRIDSXEOLVKHGILFWLRQ³WKH
UHDODXWKRUUHWLUHVIURPWKHWH[W´DQGWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRULVLQYRNHG³RQHDFKUHDGLQJ´
as the textual principle of invention and intent (1990: 75, 74). Chatman emphasizes 
KLVFRQFHSW¶VIUHHGRPIURPDQWKURSRPRUSKLFDVVXPSWLRQVE\RIIHULQJDOWHUQDWLYH
terms: ³ µWH[WLPSOLFDWLRQ¶RUµWH[WLQVWDQFH¶RUµWH[WGHVLJQ¶RUHYHQVLPSO\µWH[W
intent¶ ´ (1990: 86). Yet even these terms indicate the tension in his argument. If the 
text is to be a self-existing thing, divorced from authorial intention, then there are no 
grounds for appealing to a concept of intent at all²it is no longer required. Chatman 
LQVLVWVWKDW³WKHact of a producer, a real author, obviously differs from the product of 
WKDWDFWWKHWH[W´EXWWKHQKHFDQRQO\H[SODLQWH[WXDOLW\E\UHLQYHQWLQJWKDWDFWRI
SURGXFWLRQDVLWVHOILPPDQHQWLQWKHWH[W³,IDOOPHDQLQJV²implicit as well as 
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explicit²DUHWKHSURGXFWVRIWKHWH[W¶VDFWLYLW\DQGLIWKLVDctivity always presupposes 
DJHQF\WKHQZHKDYHWRSRVLWVRPHVXFKWH[WSULQFLSOHRUDJHQWDVWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRU´
(1990: 83, 90). He conceives of the written text as manifesting, on each reading, its 
own intentional agency²that is, a virtual oral authorship equivalent to the actual 
presence of the author. This seems to be just a more subtle version of the 
anthropomorphic trap from which he claims to have escaped. If we want to talk about 
intent in fiction, we should accept that in doing so we are necessarily invoking the 
author. Of course our idea of the author of a written narrative is no more than an 
interpretation; but this is equally true with oral narrative. 
,WZLOOEHFOHDUE\QRZWKDW,VXEVFULEHWR*HQHWWH¶VSULQFLSOHWKDW³DJHQWVVKRXOG
not be multiSOLHGXQQHFHVVDULO\´ (1988: 148). Genette has himself rejected the concept 
RIWKHLPSOLHGDXWKRUUHDVRQLQJWKDWLWKDVEHHQ³FRQVWLWXWHGE\WZRGLVWLQFWLRQVWKDW
remain blind to each other: (1) IA is not the narrator, (2) IA is not the real author, and 
it is never seen that the first is a matter of the real author and the second is a matter of 
the narrator, with no room anywhere for a third agent that would be neither the 
narrator nor WKHUHDODXWKRU´ ,W¶VDQLFHNQRFNGRZQDUJXPHQWDQG,
would only want to qualify it by extending its scope: there is no room anywhere for a 
third agent that would be neither a character nor the real author. 
My argument against the narrator, then, comes down to this: fictions are narrated 
by their authors, or by characters. Extradiegetic homodiegetic narrators, being 
represented, are characters, just as all intradiegetic narrators are. Extradiegetic 
KHWHURGLHJHWLFQDUUDWRUVWKDWLV³LPSHUVRQDO´DQG³DXWKRULDO´QDUUDWRUVZKRFDQQRW
be represented without thereby being rendered homodiegetic or intradiegetic, are in no 
way distinguishable from authors. This assertion is unaffected by the fictionality of 
the narrative, since that is best accounted for by the function of conversational 
implicature in maintaining the felicity of speech acts; nor is it affected by issues of 
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unreliability, because unreliability always requires characterization; nor by covert 
narration, because that concept is an abuse of the logic of representation; nor by the 
implied author, because the senses in which that term conflicts with my argument are 
themselves bogus. 
To repudiate the narrator as a distinct narrative agent intrinsic to the structure of 
fiction is to repudiate the idea of a closed border between the products of 
representation and the real-world discourse of the author. The narrator, postulated 
simultaneously inside and outside representation, dissociates the author from the act 
of representation: the concept accordingly divides critical attention between the events 
and characters of the fictional world in their own right, and the literary ends they 
serve as representations. The former mode of criticism requires that critics suspend 
WKHLUDZDUHQHVVRIWKHQDUUDWLYH¶VILFWLRQDOLW\WKLVDZDUHQHVVEHLQJUHVHUYHGIRUWKH
latter activity. But when the narrator disappears, so does this division in critical 
attention. By insisting that fictional representation is an authorial activity, I keep the 
fictionality of the narrative always in view: my critical attention is always to the 
literary act, the representational activity that is fiction. Instead of attending to 
representational content and artistic form by turns, I can integrate them at every point 
DVDVSHFWVRIDILFWLRQ¶Vargument: that is, the end to which a particular fiction directs 
its rhetorical resources. 
+DYLQJUHIHUUHGWRWKHFRQFHSWRIDUJXPHQWDVWKHLQVWDQWLDWLRQRIWKH³UKHWRULFRI
ILFWLRQ´,ZDQWEULHIO\WRFODULI\P\XVHRIWKDWSKUDVHVRGHDUWR%RRWK,QKLVRZQ
usage, Booth distinguished between a narrow sense, the (overt) rhetoric in fiction, and 
a broad sense, fiction as UKHWRULF³DQDVSHFWRIWKHZKROHZRUNYLHZHGDVDWRWDODFW
RIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´%RRWK>@(YHQLQWKLVEURDGHUVHQVHWKRXJK
rhetoric is in the service of representation: it is the meaQVE\ZKLFKWKHDXWKRUWULHV³WR
LPSRVHKLVILFWLRQDOZRUOGXSRQWKHUHDGHU´LELG[LLL&KDWPDQJRHVIXUWKHU
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GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQWKLVLQWHULRU³DHVWKHWLF´RULHQWDWLRQDQGDQ³LGHRORJLFDO´RQH
³5KHWRULFZRUNLQJWRLGHRORJLFDOHQGVVXDGHVXVRIVRPething outside the text, 
VRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHZRUOGDWODUJH´&KDWPDQ7KLVODVWVHQVHLVWKHRQH
WKDWLQWHUHVWVPHEXWXQOLNH&KDWPDQ,GRQRWVHHLWDVGLVWLQFWIURPKLV³DHVWKHWLF´
sense, which retains representation as an end. Such aesthetic-rhetorical appeals serve 
to establish the rightness of a fictional representation, and this rightness is itself the 
³LGHRORJLFDO´HQGWRZKLFKWKDWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLVEHLQJHPSOR\HG%\³WKHUKHWRULFRI
ILFWLRQ´WKHQ,PHDQWKHHQWLUHUHVRXUFHVRIILFWLon as a rhetoric, in itself, for 
emotional and rational effect in real-ZRUOGGLVFRXUVHDQGE\³DUJXPHQW´,PHDQ
simply the end to which these resources are used by a particular fiction. I would 
contend that the advantages of reading fiction this way far outweigh any regrets that 
might attend the demise of the narrator.
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Notes 
1
. The ubiquity of the narrator is a fundamental assumption for Gérard Genette (1980; 1988), Frank 
Stanzel (1984), Gerald Prince (1982), Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (1983) and, despite having 
entertained ideas of non-narration in Story and Discourse (1978), Seymour Chatman (1990). 
Notable dissenters, on linguistic grounds, have been Käte Hamburger (1973 [1957]), Ann 
Banfield (1982) and S.-Y. Kuroda (1976). My own objections to the narrator are based upon 
representational rather than linguistiFFULWHULDKHQFH,VKDOOEHDUJXLQJWKDWFHUWDLQ³QDUUDWRUV´DUH
outside representation, not that certain narratives function outside communication. 
2
. 6RPHQDUUDWRUVRIFRXUVHIODXQWWKHLULQYHQWLYHQHVVDQLQVWDQFHZRXOGEH)ODQQ2¶%ULHQ¶VAt 
Swim-Two-Birds. In such a case the representational frame endowed with an aura of fictional 
reality is coextensive with the personality and environment of the narrator himself. It is worth 
noting that if fictionality does indeed imply a narrator, such novels would require a second-order 
narrator to sanitize the inventiveness of the first. Critics have generally refrained from such 
follies. 
3
. Dorrit Cohn (1990: 791-800) proposes to make quite explicit the way the author/narrator 
distinction operates as a basic criterion for segregating fictional from historical narrative. 
4
. 6WDQ]HOLVHTXDOO\HPSKDWLFRQWKLVSRLQW³ZKLOHWKHDXWKRULDOQDUUDWRUDQGWKHILUVW-person 
narrator can be differentiated according to their position in regard to the represented world of the 
characters, they cannot be distinguished according to their relationship to the apparatus of 
narrative transmission. . . . They originate in that primal motivation of all narration, to make the 
ILFWLRQDOZRUOGDSSHDUDVUHDOLW\´6WDQ]HO 
5
. ThLVREVHUYDWLRQLVSDUWLFXODUO\VDOXWDU\LQUHODWLRQWR6WDQ]HO¶VUDWKHUHTXLYRFDODFFRXQWRIWKH
status of reflector-FKDUDFWHUV³ILUVW-person narrators who are actualized only as an experiencing 
self, and who therefore restrict themselves to the reflection of experiences not overtly 
communicated, are reflector-FKDUDFWHUV´³6LQFH>DUHIOHFWRU-character] does not narrate, he cannot 
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function as a transmitter in the above sense [that of a teller-FKDUDFWHU@´³7KHHSLVWHPRORJLFDO
difference between a story which is communicated by a teller-character and one which is 
presented by a reflector-character lies mainly in the fact that the teller-character is always aware 
that he is narrating, while the reflector-FKDUDFWHUKDVQRVXFKDZDUHQHVVDWDOO´6WDQ]HO145, 
146, 147). 
6
. Searle would not count the second example as an indirect speech act: his reason is that the literal 
assertion of a figurative utterance is defective (because evidently false), whereas the literal 
illocution of an indirect speech act is not. I would maintain that indirect speech acts are always 
literally defective, in terms of relevance. Searle acknowledges that they are indeed often defective 
in this respect, but denies that they are necessarily so (Searle 1975a: 70-71): it seems to me that, 
where utterances may be taken as literally felicitous, to precisely that extent they are ineffective as 
indirect speech acts. 
7
. I would want to argue further, against Genette and Searle, that first-person narration does not 
conform to a pretence account. For Genette, first-SHUVRQQDUUDWLYHPXVW³ILQDOO\FRPHGRZQWRWKH
dramatic mode (a character speaks) and consist of serious illocutions more or less tacitly posited 
as intrafictional. The pretence here consists, as Plato and Searle agree, in a simulation, or 
substitution, of identity (Homer pretends to be Chryses, Doyle pretends to be Watson, as 
6RSKRFOHVSUHWHQGVWREH2HGLSXVRU&UHRQ´E-69). I can accept the first sentence, and 
note that in saying so Genette appears to have retracted his claim that the first-person narrator is 
not a character; but against the second sentence I would argue that authors do not pretend to be 
narrating characters, they represent narrating characters. The possibility of unreliable narration 
demands this, because when such unreliability occurs the narratorial slant itself (rather than the 
HYHQWVRIWKHQDUUDWLYHLVWKHREMHFWRIWKHDXWKRU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOUKHWRULFWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQ
author and narrator is essential to interpretation. In first-person narration, authors do not imitate 
WKHQDUUDWLQJFKDUDFWHUQRU³WKHPDNLQJRIDQDVVHUWLRQ´EXWDGLVFXUVLYHLGLRP 
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8
. 6HH0DU\/RXLVH3UDWW3UDWW¶VFRQFHSWRI³QDUUDWLYHGLVSOD\WH[W´VHHPVYHU\FORVHWRZKDW
is needed here: it is notable that her only reason for ultimately subordinating this concept to the 
imitation speech act model is the assumption that all fictions have narrators (1977: 173, 207-8). 
My brief reformulation is only a sketch of the possible result of abandoning this assumption, and 
obviously needs clarification at several points: I am aware, for example, that the implied act I 
posit does not comfortably fit within the category of indirect speech acts as defined by Searle, or 
even Genette. 
9
. For a far more systematic analysis of unreliable narration, see Tamar Yacobi (1981; 1987), who 
places it in the context of alternative means of resolving interpratative incongruities²categorized 
as the genetic, generic, existential and functional principles. I am in broad sympathy with 
<DFREL¶VDFFRXQt, which I do not consider to be seriously undermined by my dissent from its 
GHFODUHGSUHPLVH³,QVRIDUDVILFWLRQDOLW\FKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHGLVFRXUVHDVZHOODVWKHZRUOGRI
OLWHUDWXUHOLWHUDU\FRPPXQLFDWLRQLVDOZD\VPHGLDWHG´2QWKHFULWHULDfor 
unreliability, see also Marie-Laure Ryan (1984: 127-28). 
10
. $FFRUGLQJWR<DFREL³7REHFRPHXQUHOLDEOH>WKHQDUUDWRU@PXVWEHH[SRVHGDVVXFKE\VRPH
definite norm of congruity and to some definite effect. . . . In the absence of concrete grounds²or 
what appears to be so on the surface²even if the distinction between author and narrator still 
holds in theory, then for all practical reading purposes it gets blurred, almost to the point of 
GLVDSSHDUDQFH´-7). This hedged dichotomy between the practical and the theoretical 
(which exercises Yacobi again on page 357) is obviated once it is admitted that the mediation of a 
narrator is not inherent in fiction. 
11
. Obviously this provides no basis for a qualitative distinction between extradiegetic and 
LQWUDGLHJHWLFQDUUDWRUV0DUORZDQG0PHGH5RFKHILGH¶VDGPLUHUDUHVXEMHFWWRWKHVDPH
FRQVWUDLQWV$FFRUGLQJO\LWGRHVQ¶WSURYLGHIRUDQ\VXFKGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQQDUUDWLQJDQGRWKHU
characters either. There is a recursiveness about the act of narration, compared to other 
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represented acts, that tends to highlight the representational contingency of character; but this 
contingency applies to any character, as recent innovative fiction has shown (I take the 
disintegration of Slothrop in *UDYLW\¶V5DLQERZ to be a quite explicit example). Representation 
involves no commitment to the continuity of characters except insofar as this is itself a privileged 
representational objective²which of course, in any broadly realist fiction, is the case most of the 
time. 
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